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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Maurice Troutman was charged with a single count of rape after having had sex
with a woman at the Grove Hotel in Boise. The State's theory was that the alleged
victim was either unconscious at the time, or unable to resist, due to her ingestion of
alcohol and a prescription sleeping aid, Ambien. The alleged victim had very little
recollection of the sex with Mr. Troutman.
Mr. Troutman's defense was that the sex was purely consensual, the alleged
victim was an active participant, and the fact that the alleged victim simply did not
remember it did not make it rape. In support of this defense, he presented evidence
that one of the side effects of Ambien is that people using it can appear wide awake and
fully functional at times during the night, but have no recollection of the night's activities
the following morning. This phenomenon is known as intro grade amnesia.
Ultimately, however, a jury found Mr. Troutman guilty and the district court
imposed a sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed.
Mr. Troutman timely appealed. On appeal, he contends that, throughout her
opening, closing, and rebuttal arguments, the prosecutor in his case engaged in
numerous acts of misconduct which, whether considered individually, or in the
aggregate, constitute fundamental error entitling Mr. Troutman to a new trial.

In

response, the State argues that Mr. Troutman "has failed to establish error, much less
fundamental error, in relation to any of the prosecutor's statements." (Respondent's
Brief, p.9.) In support of this proposition, it addresses each of Mr. Troutman's claims in
turn, arguing in each instance that no misconduct was committed (Respondent's Brief,

pp.13-28), and then it concludes by briefly asserting that Mr. Troutman's Appellant's
Brief failed to offer any argument in support of his contention that the prosecutor's
misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error (Respondent's Brief, pp.28-29).
The present Reply Brief is necessary to point out where the State has
mischaracterized the prosecutor's arguments in an effort to make them appear proper,
and where it is mistaken as to the law.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedincls
The procedural history of this case was accurately detailed in Mr. Troutman's
Appellant's Brief. Because that summary of the procedural history of the case was
sufficient for purposes of the present appeal, no further discussion of the procedural
history is necessary at this time.
Likewise, the factual history of this case was accurately summarized in
Mr. Troutman's Appellant's Brief. Thus, further discussion of the facts is not strictly
necessary at this point. However, because the State's attempt to highlight certain facts
may have created a misleading picture of the trial evidence, a brief further discussion is
prudent.
First, in describing events occurring in the hours leading up to the alleged rape,
the State discusses the fact that, after Ms. Schillereff had taken an Ambien pill and gone
to bed, Ms. Relano (accompanied by the Blitz player she ultimately spent the night with)
returned to the hotel room she had rented with Ms. Schillereff to change her clothes.
(Respondent's Brief, p.2.) While these are accurate statements about the evidence, it is
worthwhile to point out that the State has omitted the fact that, while Ms. Relano and the
football player were in the room in the middle of the night, Ms. Schillereff was awake

and functional, and even took a picture of her friend kissing the football player, but had
no memory of that event in the morning. (See Tr., p.100, L.18

- p.101, L.18, p.132,

L.21 - p.134, L.10, p.140, L.10 - p.143, L.7; see also Exs.15 & 15A (picture taken by
Ms. Schillereff).) Obviously, these facts support the inference that the Ambien caused
intro grade amnesia such that, although awake and functional, Ms. Schillereff simply
could not remember some of what she did on the night in question.
I

I

Second, in describing the alleged rape, the State describes some of the evidence

I
I

regarding Detective Brechwald and Detective Vucinich's interrogations of Mr. Troutman,

I

asserting that the evidence was that Mr. Troutman admitted that he initiated physical

I

I
1
I

contact, Ms. Schillereff mumbled something incoherent, and then he penetrated her

I

from behind. (Respondent's Brief, p.5.) Again, while these are accurate statements on

I
I

II

I

I

the State's part, they are somewhat misleading because of the information omitted by
the State.

In fact, according to Detective Brechwald's testimony, as well as the

transcript of the interrogation with Detective Vucinich, Mr. Troutman also maintained
that, after he lay down next to Ms. Schillereff, he woke her up, whereupon she "scooted
her buttocks over towards his groin area and started grinding on him," and that she not
only unzipped Mr. Troutman's pants and helped him remove them, but removed her
own pants and, later, while the couple was having sex, changed positions such that she
was on top of him. (Tr., p.457, L.25 - p.458, L.16; Ex. 22A, p.12, Ls.5-16; see also Ex.
22A, p. 19, Ls. 1-4 (transcript of interrogation with Det. Brechwald, wherein Mr. Troutman
again described Ms. Schillereff as having been on top of him during sex).) Obviously,

I

these facts undercut the State's attempt to portray Ms. Schillereff as a virtually

I
I

unconscious victim.

ISSUE

Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct depriving Mr. Troutman of due process of law
and a fair trial, such that h e is now entitled to a new trial?

ARGUMENT
The Prosecutor's Misconduct Warrants A New Trial
A.

Introduction
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Troutman raised five distinct claims of prosecutorial

misconduct arising out of the prosecutor's closing arguments. He argued that, not only
were many of the prosecutor's comments improper but, whether considered individually
or in the aggregate, they were so egregious as to rise to the level of fundamental error.
In response, the State argues that, not only was there no misconduct that was so
egregious as to rise to the level of fundamental error, but there was no misconduct at
all. For the reasons set forth in detail below, the State is wrong on both points.
B.

Standard Of Review And Other Applicable Lesal Standards
The standard of review applicable to prosecutorial misconduct claims (de novo

review) was identified in Mr. Troutman's Appellant's Brief (p.8), and it does not appear
that the State takes issue with that standard. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.9-11.) The
State does, however, go on to make a curious claim as to the legal standard applicable
to claims of prosecutorial misconduct committed during closing arguments. This claim
warrants further discussion.
In reciting the legal standards applicable to claims of prosecutorial misconduct
during closing arguments, the State implies that misconduct committed during that
stage of the trial is less likely to warrant relief for the defendant because the prosecutor
is less culpable for his misconduct due to the "improvisational nature" of closing
arguments. (See Respondent's Brief, p.1 I.) Specifically, the State cites State v. Field,
144 ldaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007), for the proposition that "[tjhe ldaho

Supreme Court has recently reiterated the importance of reviewing closing arguments in
light of their improvisational nature . . . ." (Respondent's Brief, p.11.)

Such an

argument, however, is meritless. First, it defies logic, as there is no reason to believe
that closing arguments are any more improvisational in nature than any other portion of
a trial, such as the examination of a witness.

Second, even assuming that the

prosecutor's closing argument is particularly improvisational, the Field Court certainly
did not "recently reiterate[ ] the importance of reviewing closing arguments in light of
their improvisational nature," as the State now claims. In fact, Field involved a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct committed in the questioning of a witness, not during closing
arguments. Field, 144 at 571-72, 165 P.2d at 285-86. Third, the State fails to explain
how, if, as it argues elsewhere in its brief, "the touchstone of due process analysis in
cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability
of the prosecutor" (Respondent's Brief, p.10 (quoting Smifh v. Phillips, 455

U.S.209,

219 (1982))), it should be entitled to any leeway because the prosecutor's statements
were made "on the fly" and the prosecutor was, therefore, less culpable. In other words,
the State's prayer for leniency is inconsistent with United States Supreme Court
precedent and overlooks the fact that the crux of Mr. Troutman's prosecutorial
misconduct claim is that he was denied due process and a fair trial by the prosecutorial
arguments in question. Accordingly, contrary to the State's claim, the State ought not to
be cut any slack simply because the prosecutor may have been improvising when she
made arguments that had the effect of denying Mr. Troutman a fair trial.

C.

The Prosecutor Enaaqed In Numerous Acts Of Misconduct
1.

The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct Bv Asking The Jury To Draw
Inferences Which She Knew To Be False And Were Whollv Inconsistent
With The State's Theory In Another Case. And Bv Doing So For The
Purpose Of Preiudicina The Jury Aaainst Mr. Troutman

In his Appellant's Brief (pp.8-14), Mr. Troutman argued that the prosecutor
committed misconduct when she argued as follows:
At 4:53 a.m. we know that room has been entered a second time. I
don't have to prove if there was a rape or theft there, because the victim is
unconscious. She is unaware these multiple entries are happening. She
doesn't know who is coming into the room, to tell us again at 5:09 a.m., 16
minutes later, the room is entered again.
The same key card the defendant had in his possession. That key
card never went back to [Ms. Relano] and was never placed back into the
room, so he had it, and he says he handed off to a third party unknown to
the victim. Okay?
So either he [Mr. Troutmanl or someone that he designated, bv
passing it along, is aoing into that room again. And that happens, a
second entry happens. Again, don't know if there is rape or theft
happenina aaain.
[The key card] again is used one hour later. There is a fourth entrv.
Again, do not know what other crimes were committed aaainst this woman
durina that time frame. We do know at some point the iPod was taken
from the room. Her other luggage was searched. The wires that go with it
are taken out of the room as well, and again, I don't know-that's a side
issue. I don't know if Mr. Troutman did that bevond a reasonable doubt or
if his buddy that he passed the card to did that, but I do know that
Mr. Troutman returned it all to the front desk when he knew the police was
[sic] on them, and he would be getting caught.
All of that, mere inability to know who's in there, how many times he
is coming in, she is not aroused. She is not awakened. She does not
know, and she does not even realize a theft has happened, because she
is that unaware and sedated and unconscious and helpless.
And their repetitive entering into the room obviously speaks
squarely to the point of her ability to be able to appreciate the nature of the
act, which is penetration in this case.

(Tr., p.642, L.5

- p.643,

L.20 (emphasis added).) Mr. Troutman contends that this

portion of the prosecutor's closing argument was improper because, as the underlined
portions make clear, it sought to have the jury infer that Mr. Troutman entered
Ms. Schillereffs hotel room to victimize her on mulfiple occasions, even though the
prosecutor knew (based on both the trial evidence and the outside evidence) that, of the
four entries to Ms. Schillereff's room during the relevant timeframe, Mr. Troutman
entered only once, and that Mr. Reynolds entered the room the other three times.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-14.) Specifically, Mr. Troutman asserts that the prosecutor's
implication constituted misconduct for three reasons: it sought to have the jury draw an
inference that the prosecutor knew to be false; it was inconsistent with the evidence
within and outside the case; and it was clearly calculated to prejudice the jury against
Mr. Troutman. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-14.)
In response, the State provides a number of reasons why the above-quoted
argument is, in its view, perfectly acceptable. (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-20.) First, the
State claims that "the clear import" of the prosecutor's argument was that the fact that
there were multiple entries to Ms. Schillereff's hotel room indicates that she was
unconscious and, thus, unable to have consented to sex with Mr. Troutman during the
first entry. (Respondent's Brief, pp.14-15 (emphasis added).) However, while that
could certainly be said to be the clear import of a portion of the above-quoted argument
(the two paragraphs beginning with "[all1 of that"), it most certainly is not the clear import
of the statements tending to raise the inference that Mr. Troutman had been the one to
re-enter the room and victimize Ms. Schillereff repeatedly.

Second, the State asks this Court to believe that the prosecutor did not commit
misconduct because she did not know for certain that Mr. Troutman did not re-enter
Ms. Schillereff's hotel room. (Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16.) The problem, however, is
that under this reasoning, a prosecutor could make any wildly speculative argument,
even if all of the evidence suggests that that argument is false, and then hide behind a
claim that she did not know for sure what the truth was because she was not there to
personally see what happened. Surely prosecutors are held to a higher standard than
that. See, e.g., Sfafe V. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, -, 71 P. 608, 610 (1903) ("Nothing should
tempt [the prosecutor] to . . . make statements to the jury which, whether true or not,
have not been proved. The desire for success should never induce [the prosecutor] to
endeavor to obtain a verdict by arguments based on anything except the evidence in
the case, and the conclusions legitimately deducible from the law applicable to the
same . . . .").
Third, the State now defends the inference it asked the jury to draw by
speculating that Mr. Troutman could have re-entered the room with Mr. Reynolds at
some point. (Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16.) However, this is rank speculation on the
State's part. The best the State can do to support this speculative argument is point to
one portion of the grand jury transcript where one of the detectives, while being asked
about Mr. Reynolds' interrogation, testified that "I believe that he mentioned a camera"
while discussing what he saw the first time he entered Ms. Schillereff's room. (Grand
Jury Tr., p.168, Ls.14-21.) The State tries to reason that, since there is evidence that
Mr. Troutman took Ms. Schillereff's camera (see Tr., p.216, Ls.8-24), but Mr. Reynolds
might have seen a camera in Ms. Schillereff's room after Mr. Troutman had left,

Mr. Troutman must have gone back with Mr. Reynolds to take the camera during a
subsequent entry to the room. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16.) This, however, is
far from a reasonable inference, especially since the grand jury testimony summarizing
Mr. Reynolds' admissions to the police makes it quite clear that entered Ms. Schillereff's
room alone on three occasions. (See Grand Jury Tr., p.164, L.20

-

p.175, L . l l

(repeatedly using the word "he," not "they," while referring to Mr. Reynolds' entries into
Ms. Schillereff's hotel room, thus making it clear that Mr. Reynolds told the police, or at
least implied, that he had acted alone on those occasions).) Moreover, as if the State's
"logic" is not tenuous enough on its face, one must remember that the State did not
even seek an indictment against Mr. Troutman for any successive entries into the hotel
room, much less get an burglary indictment for any such entry.' (See R., pp.11-13.)
Rather, the State went after Mr. Reynolds for the re-entries, seeking indictments on two
counts of burglary for the second and third (of the four) entries in question (see
R., pp.12-13), the two instances where he admitted entering the room with the intent to
have sex andlor steal (see Grand Jury Tr., p.165, L.22 - p.172, L.20).' The bottom line

I

With regard to Mr. Troutman, the State sought an indictment on one count of rape, and
one count of burglary. (See R., p.12.) Presumably, the burglary count, since it alleged
the intent to commit a rape or a theft, related only to Mr. Troutman's readily-admitted
entry into the room, Le., the first of the four entries in question. (R., p.12.) However,
even if that burglary count was intended to be broad enough to cover any entry by
Mr. Troutman into the room, the reality is that the grand jury did not find probable cause
of any burglary. (See R., p.12.) Accordingly, it is clear that the grand jury rejected the
notion that Mr. Troutman ever entered Ms. Schillereff's room with the intent to commit a
crime, which surely would have had to have been the case had he re-entered the room
after having sex with Ms. Schillereff.
Apparently, the State did not seek an indictment for Mr. Reynolds' third entry (see
R., pp.12-13), the fourth of the night, where he told the police he did not know why he
went in the room (see Grand Jury Tr., p.172, L.21 - p.173, L.17).

'

is that there is no reasonable basis to believe that Mr. Troutman ever re-entered
Ms. Schillereff's room after the visit where he had sex with her.
Fourth, turning its focus away from the evidence and onto the law, the State
seeks to distinguish the cases cited in Mr. Troutman's Appellant's Brief in support of the
proposition that a prosecutor cannot offer inconsistent theories as to how a crime was
committed. (Respondent's Brief, pp.16-17.) In making this attempt, the State focuses
on the facts that: (a) Mr. Reynolds did not take his case to trial and, instead, entered
into a plea agreement; and (b) Mr. Troutman and Mr. Reynolds were ultimately
convicted of different offenses. (Respondent's Brief, pp.16-17.) However, the State
presents two distinctions without any meaningful differences. The triallplea distinction is
meaningless because the fact is that, since the State obtained a conviction of
Mr. Reynolds based on the claim that he was the one who re-entered Ms. Schillereff's
room on numerous occasions, it ought not to be allowed to turn around and obtain a
conviction of Mr. Troutman on the theory that he was the one who re-entered the room
(especially where, as noted above, the prosecutor knew all the evidence suggested
otherwise). Likewise, the different offense distinction is meaningless because, although
Mr. Reynolds and Mr. Troutman were not ultimately convicted of the same offense, the
fact is that they have both lost their liberty based on the prosecutor's manipulation of the
evidence.
Fifth, the State points to language in Nguyen v. Lindsey, 232 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir.
2000), to the effect that "trial preparation is not a static process," arguing that this Court
would have to ignore that truism in order to find misconduct in this case. (Respondent's
Brief, p.18.) However, the State's argument is misleading since the above-quoted

portion of Nguyen appeared as part of a larger discussion of how new evidence coming
to light between one case and the next will justify inconsistent positions. Nguyen, 232
F.3d at 1240. In this situation though, there is no allegation that conditions changed, or
that new evidence came to light, between the grand jury proceedings and
Mr. Troutman's trial, or between Mr. Troutman's trial and Mr. Reynolds' guilty plea.
Finally, as a point of clarification, the State mistakenly asserts that Mr. Troutman
has claimed a violation of ldaho Rule of Evidence 404(b). (Respondent's Brief, p.19.)
This is not so. In fact, as should have been clear from Mr. Troutman's Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Troutman contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by using the false
inference that Mr. Troutman had made repeated entries into Ms. Schillereff's room to
prejudice the jury against Mr. Troutrnan.

(Appellant's Brief, p.14.)

In making this

argument, Mr. Troutman cited Rule 404(b) merely to show that ldaho law recognizes
that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts (besides that those that are charged)
is potentially highly prejudicial to the defendant. (See Appellant's Brief, p.14.)
2.

The Prosecutor Enaaaed In Misconduct Bv Distortina Mr. Troutman's
Defense. Askina The Jurors To Convict Mr. Troutman In An Effort To Cure
Societal Problems And Out Of Fear For Their Own Safetv (Or The Safety
Of Others). And Bv Seekina To Reduce The State's Burden Of Proof

In his Appellant's Brief (pp.15-20), Mr. Troutman argued that the prosecutor
committed misconduct when she began her rebuttal argument with the following
comments:
[H]e would have a done deal if, based on this argument, we are all going
to have to put heavy locks on our doors, on the windows in our house and
wear chastity belts when we go to bed, because in case you are lawfully
ingesting any substance that makes you unable to fend for yourself and
the next day you can't remember much about what's happened, but the
law enforcement has done their absolute best and has figured out the

criminal involved and the crime that's committed, you are at fault, and
there is no crime.
Under this suggestion, if your house door is unlocked and a person
walking by decides that they are going to check all the doors in the
neighborhood in the middle of the night and see who's got something they
can take, comes into your house, and you happen to have taken a
sleeping pill, or whatever, or are just a really heavy sleeper and someone
comes through your house, take everything you have and goes, "Hey,
buddy, I'm taking your car," and you don't wake up, and he leaves.
When he is caught later, he is going to go, "I was in his house. It
was unlocked. He didn't tell me I couldn't come in."
And then I said to him, "Dude, I'm taking your car, and he doesn't
remember, and he did not follow the warnings on the Ambien he was
taking that said don't mix it with alcohol, that's his fault."
When you start shifting the blame in a case like this onto the victim
for her inability to remember every detail of what she was doing behind
her locked door, in her own bedroom, in her own bed, then you are turning
the world upside down. Justice not in its real sense, but what conceptual
sense is.
(Tr., p.665, L.2

- p.666, L.15.)

He argued that this misconduct continued, when a short

while later, the prosecutor argued as follows: "People who are victimized, you cannot
blame them later that they may have a mental illness, maybe they have Alzheimer's.
This means that those folks are open target. They might not know what happens to
them, because they can't remember tomorrow what happened." (Tr., p.670, Ls.5-10.)
Specifically, Mr. Troutman asserts that these arguments distorted and mischaracterized
Mr. Troutman's defense, exhorted the jury to convict based on a desire to cure a greater
societal problem andlor out of fear for themselves or others, and sought to reduce the
State's burden of proof. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-20.)
in response, the State offers a number of arguments, none of which has any
merit. First, ironically enough, the State accuses Mr. Troutman of a mischaracterization;
it claims that his description of the prosecutor's closing argument is "false" insofar as he

argued that it mischaracterized his trial defense as one of "I didn't hear her say 'no,' so I
took that as a 'yes."' (Respondent's Brief, p.21.) The State claims that "[njowhere in
the arguments cited by Troutman, and excerpted above, did the prosecutor characterize
the defense in this manner." (Respondent's Brief, p.21.) However, once again, the
State is being less than honest. As quoted above, the prosecutor tried to scare the jury
with a hypothetical situation involving a heavy sleeper who had all of his belongings,
including his car, taken, and then she warned that "[wjhen he [the perpetrator] is caught
later, he is going to go, "I was in his house. It was unlocked. He didn't tell me I couldn't
come in." (Tr., p.665, L.15 - p.666, L.3.) Clearly, the intent with this hypothetical was to
mischaracterize the defense in this case as one of "I didn't hear her say 'no,' so I took
that as a 'yes,"' and then portray the precedent that would be set if Mr. Troutman were
to be acquitted.
Second, the State asserts, in conclusory fashion, that the above-quoted
arguments "simply urged the jury to reject Troutman's argument that the jury could not
find him guilty because Heather could not remember whether the sex was consensual."
(Respondent's Brief, pp.21-22.) However, this attempt re-cast the prosecutor's rebuttal
argument in terms that would not be considered improper is quite disingenuous. The
above-quoted argument was much more than a simple plea to focus on the
circumstantial evidence in the case. By conjuring up images of a world where decent
citizens need "heavy locks" and "chastity belts" to protect themselves from home
invaders, the prosecutor engaged in an unabashed attempt to frighten the jurors into
convicting Mr. Troutman out of fear for their safety, the safety of their friends and loved

ones, and the safety of society as a whole. As such, this portion of her argument was
plainly improper.
Third, although the State specifically attempts to refute the foregoing argument,
asserting that "[tlhe prosecutor was not, as Troutman suggests, urging the jury to
convict Troutman to 'alleviate' a 'societal problem[ ]'-she

was using an analogy in

response to describe the practical effect of the defense's theory of the case" (alteration
in State's brief; footnote omitted), and then asserting baldly that "[tlhis is not improper"
(Respondent's Brief, p.22), the reality is that even if this argument was not clearly belied
by a plain reading of the prosecutor's argument, the State's current argument in defense
of the prosecutor demonstrates that her rebuttal argument was, in fact, improper.
Indeed, even the State concedes that the prosecutor sought to portray "the practical
effect" of an acquittal; however, the "practical effect" of an acquittal, i.e., how and
acquittal in this case would affect future cases or society as a whole, should not have
factored into the jury's decision-making process in this case; the jury should have been
concerned only with the evidence in the case at hand. As the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has held, arguments such as those that were made here run the risk of causing
a conviction "for reasons wholly irrelevant to [the defendant's] own guilt or innocence.
Jurors may be persuaded by such appeals to believe that, by convicting a defendant,
they will assist in the solution of some pressing social problem. The amelioration of
society's woes is far too heavy a burden for the individual criminal defendant to bear."3
United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005).

Notably, in its Respondent's Brief, the State feigns ignorance, claiming that it cannot
figure out what "societal problem" Mr. Troutman has argued that the prosecutor
improperly sought to have the jury concern itself with. (See Respondent's Brief, p.22 &

Fourth, the State denies that the portion of the above-quoted argument which
implied that law enforcement had done "their absolute best" and had found "the
criminal" was an attempt to lower the State's burden of proof by essentially vouching for
law enforcement's opinion that Mr. Troutman is guilty of a crime. (Respondent's Brief,
pp.22-23.) The State defends the prosecutor's comments as "an assertion that the jury
was not required to acquit Troutman simply because [Ms. Schillereffj could not
'remember much about what[ ] happened"' (Respondent's Brief, pp.22-23 (quoting
prosecutor's closing argument).) However, if that truly had been the prosecutor's intent,
there was no need to discuss law enforcement at all, much less imply that it had done
its "absolute best" and caught "the criminal" because the manner by which the
investigation is handled is completely irrelevant to the question of whether a conviction
can be had despite Ms. Schillereffs faulty memory (unless, of course, the prosecutor
was trying to frighten the jurors with a parade of horrible societal repercussions of a "not
guilty" verdict).
3.

The Prosecutor Enqa~edin Misconduct BV Attempting To Generate
Svmpathv For Ms. Schillereff And/or Derision For Mr. Troutman

In his Appellant's Brief (pp.17-18 & n.7, pp.20-23), Mr. Troutman argued that the
prosecutor committed misconduct when she repeatedly employed tactics that were
clearly calculated to engender sympathy for Ms. Schillereff and resentment toward
Mr. Troutman.

With regard to the tactics intended to generate sympathy for

Ms. Schillereff, the State argues that the prosecutor's tactics "hardly constitute

n.6.) Obviously, the societal problem that Mr. Troutman referred to (and, indeed, the
societal problem that the prosecutor sought to have the jurors be concerned with) was
the problem of home invasions involving sex crimes and thefts.
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misconduct," and that, even if the prosecutor did engage in misconduct, "it is unlikely
the prosecutor's characterizations of [Ms. Schillereffl and her experience further
influenced the jury to convict Troutman." (Respondent's Brief, pp.23-24.) Since these
are conclusory arguments on the State's part, no further response is necessary;
Mr. Troutman's Appellant's Brief and the trial transcript speak for themselves.
With regard to the tactics intended to generate resentment toward Mr. Troutman,
the State argues that, because the evidence underlying the arguments in question was
in the record, it was perfectly acceptable for the prosecutor to highlight that evidence in
any fashion she so chose during her closing argument. (Respondent's Brief, p.24.)
However, there are two significant flaws with this argument. First, as noted above,
there was no evidence in the record to support the prosecutor's claim that Mr. Troutman
had repeatedly entered Ms. Schillereff's room, repeatedly assaulted her, or took her
iPod. Second, the fact that a certain piece of evidence is in the record does not give the
prosecutor license to argue that the jury should consider that evidence for an improper
purpose. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997). In this case,
the fact that Mr. Troutman did not use a condom when he had sex with Ms. Schillereff
was wholly irrelevant to any fact that was at issue in this case; it was only in the trial
record at all as part of the res gestae of the case. Accordingly, the prosecutor's
decision to highlight that fact repeatedly during her closing arguments, and to do so in
the manner in which she did,4 was clearly an attempted to appeal to the passions and
prejudices of the jury and, as such, was plainly improper.

In a comment that was clearly an attack on Mr. Troutman's character, the prosecutor
argued first that "[hle did not care enough to protect who he is going to have sex with."
(Tr., p.650, Ls.4-6.) Later, in a comment that was both an attack on his character, and a

4.

The Prosecutor En~aoedIn Misconduct By Attackina Mr. Troutman's
Credibilitv Based Her Own "Testimony"

In his Appellant's Brief (pp.23-24), Mr. Troutman argued that the prosecutor
committed misconduct when she essentially made herself a witness when she
interjected new evidence (her own life experiences) into the case during her closing
argument by stating "I am yet to hear from a single woman who has done that-this
anecdotal from him-that

is

there are women who have sex with multiple members at one

time, willingly have sex with multiple members at one time . . . ." (Tr., p.652, Ls.1-9.) In
response, the State attempts to characterize the prosecutor's comment as possibly
relating to the evidence presented (or not presented, as the case may be) by the
defense at trial, not her own life experiences.

(Respondent's Brief, p.25.)

This

argument, while creative, is unconvincing since the prosecutor said she had "yet to hear
from a single woman who" would be willing to engage in sexual activity with a number of
professional football players. The word "yet" implied that she might still hear from such
a woman in the future and, since the prosecutor surely knew that all the evidence had

been heard (such that no such woman could be called to testify in Mr. Troutman's case)
by the time she began her closing arguments, she must have meant that she had "yet"
to hear from such a woman in her own life. Thus, it is reasonably clear that, as
Mr. Troutman argued in his Appellant's Brief, the prosecutor interjected her own life
experience into the case, which was improper. See Sfafe v. Marfinez, 136 Idaho 521,

plea for sympathy for Ms. Schillereff, she made a point of reminding the jury that "[slhe
[Ms. Schillereffj has to take protective measures later to make sure she doesn't get
pregnant by him or she doesn't get all the things that come along with unprotected sex
she doesn't know about." (Tr., p.669, Ls.6-11.)
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525, 37 P.3d 18, 22 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561, 566, 21 P.3d 498,
503 (Ct. App. 2001).
5.

The Prosecutor Enaaqed In Misconduct Bv Asking The Juw To Convict
Mr. Troutman Based On A Presum~tionOf R a ~ And/or
e
In An Effort To
Change Existina "Lenient" Cultural Views Reqardina Sex

In his Appellant's Brief (pp.24-26), Mr. Troutman argued that the prosecutor
committed misconduct when, while discussing her assertion that Mr. Troutman had
stolen Ms. Schillereff's camera, she launched into a discussion about how, "I don't know
what it is about our culture . . . we give more importance to someone taking a tangible
thing from us without our permission, but we are more lenient about the issue of
someone having sexual penetration. . . . [with sex, we are willing to sort of go into the
realm of unreasonable, unfortunately." (Tr., p.656, Ls.9-24.) Mr. Troutman argued,
inter alia, that this argument mischaracterized the defense as being one of "she didn't
say 'no,' so it's not rape"; effectively sought to lower the State's burden of proof by
implying that, without express permission, the sex between Mr. Troutman and
Ms. Schillereff was necessarily non-consensual; and exhorted the jury to find
Mr. Troutman guilty in order to change, or at least make a statement against, societal
views about sex which the prosecutor feels are too lax. (Appellant's Brief, pp.24-26.)
In response, the State devotes much energy to useless disparagement of
Mr. Troutman's argument. (Respondent's Brief, pp.25-28.) However, it does argue, in
part, as follows:
[I]t is certainly apparent when the entire argument is read in context
that the prosecutor was not urging the jury to presume anything or to be
more sympathetic to the prosecution based on "cultural norms." Rather
she was highlighting that there is no distinction between taking a piece of
property without someone's permission and taking something more
personal and intimate without their permission. This is improper.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.27-28.) With this argument, the State does actually raise a
valid point: it probably would not have been improper for the prosecutor to have argued
simply that there is no distinction between taking personal property and raping
someone, in the sense that they have been deemed criminal by the Idaho Legislature.
Unfortunately, the prosecutor did not confine her argument to that in this case; here, she
argued about cultural norms, society's "lenient" treatment of cases involving "sexual
penetration," and society's willingness "to sort of go into the realm of unreasonable,
unfortunately," in cases involving sex, and she asked the jury to make a statement
against society's "lenient" norms by convicting Mr. Troutman. (Tr., p.656, Ls.8-24.)
Thus, despite the State's attempts to re-characterize the prosecutor's closing argument,
it cannot conceal the fact that it was an improper appeal to convict Mr. Troutman based
on matters outside the evidence-namely,

a desire to ameliorate society's woes. See

Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d at 1149.
D.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Complained Of In This Case Constitutes
Fundamental Error
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Troutman conceded that none of the instances of

prosecutorial misconduct complained of were objected to by trial counsel, but argued
that this Court should nonetheless consider his claims on their merits because the
instances of misconduct in question, "whether considered individually, or in the
aggregate, constitute fundamental error because so much of [the misconduct] was
calculated [to] inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury and influence the verdict
with matters outside the evidence." (Appellant's Brief, pp.27-28.) Since the nature of
the individual instances of misconduct had already been discussed elsewhere in his
Appellant's Brief (see Appellant's Brief, pp.8-26), it was unnecessary to again describe

the instances of misconduct or the reasons why those instances of misconduct
constituted emotional appeals and other arguments to have the jury decide the case on
matters outside the evidence in the section of his Brief discussing the fundamental error
standard.
In response the State attempts to procedurally default Mr. Troutman's
fundamental error argument. Citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966,
970 (1996), the State claims that this Court cannot even reach the fundamental error
question because "Troutman has failed to present any argument on this point . . . ."
(Respondent's Brief, pp.28-29.) This argument is frivolous for two reasons. First,
Mr. Troutman's fundamental error argument is not a claim for relief; it is an argument in
support of all of his claims. Thus, Zichko does not even apply in this instance. Second,
even if Zichko does apply, Mr. Troutman's fundamental error argument was, in fact,
supported by argument (however brief that argument might have been).

(See

Appellant's Brief, p.28.)
The reality is that the fundamental error analysis in the present case is quite
straightforward: the prosecutor improperly asked the jury to draw certain inferences in
an effort to generate resentment toward Mr. Troutman; she tried to generate sympathy
for Ms. Schillereff; she repeatedly sought to have the jury decide the case based on fear
or in order to vindicate or, in one case, make a statement against, societal norms; and
she repeatedly distorted Mr. Troutman's defense. Under these circumstances, it is clear
that the misconduct was "calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion
or prejudice against the defendant, or [was] so inflammatory that the jurors may [have
been influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence," State v. Babb, 125

Idaho 934, 942, 877 P.2d 905, 913 (1994), and, thus, meets the criteria for fundamental
error.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Troutman respectfully requests that the judgment of conviction in this case be
vacated, and that his case be remanded for a new trial.
DATED this gthday of April, 2009.
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